

ANIMADVERSIONS *on a Postscript to the
Defence of Dr. Sherlock, against the Calm
Discourse of the Sober Enquirer: As also
on the Letter to a Friend concerning that
Postscript.*

BEFORE I begin them, I shall take a little notice of the several Characters which seem to distinguish each Author.

The Doctor, or Dean, or Defender, (no matter which I name, for they Three are One) wants nothing to make him a good Writer, but a good Cause, and says as much for a bad, as any Man can; nay, and when the Nature of the Cause will bear no more, he makes it good with Magisterial Grace and big Assurance. He has always Logick enough by him, to prove a Trinity of Faculties, Relations, Modes, to be only a Trinity of Names; and a Trinity of Essences or Natures, to be a Trinity of Gods. All that can be said of him is, that he takes no care of himself, but sacrifices his own Hypothesis, to make sure work with that of his Adversary.

His Adversary the *Enquirer*, steps forth from the Press, at his first Appearance in the Cause, with all the winning Civility, and good Nature in the World. He will not be so rude as to say, that his Hypothesis is the certain Truth of the Matter; only he hopes that his gentle Reader will be so courteous, as to grant it possible.

The Dean would do the *Enquirer* a singu-

lar Favour, to let him be now and then of his Opinion; but that being not granted, puts him a little out of temper; yet he quickly recovers himself, and when he has cut the Dean with a bitter Sarcastm, p. 42. he gives him in a healing Parenthesis, an Anonymus Contradistinction.

In short, this is the Case between the Dean and the *Enquirer*: The one deals rude and heavy Blows; the other neatly offers dangerous Thrusts. You may fancy them engaging like *Æneas* and *Mercutius* in *Virgil*, who maintain the Fight,

Hic gladio fidens, hic acies & ardens hastâ.

In the first Page of the Postscript, I meet with these words, — I do not intend to examine the Book, nor approve or disprove it; and yet he examin'd the Book, — and that not carelessly neither. I have again and again consider'd those Words, and perhaps at last have spelt the just Sense and Meaning of 'em, and yet but part of 'em; for why he should disown intending to examine the Book, that I can't account for, nor perhaps himself. When he avows he did not intend to approve the Book, he avows that which is Grammatical-

ly and Literally true; it never came into his Head, to set his Seal to any thing of Mr. *H*—w's drawing up. And when he says, he did not intend to disapprove it, that is Rhetorically and Figuratively true: for by the Figure call'd *Apophasis*, a Man denies to do or say that which he says most emphatically, and does most indifferently. Having now said thus much, why may not I be allow'd to guess at the Reason, why the Dean profess'd, that he intended not to approve or disapprove Mr. *H*'s Book: possibly it might be this; He can patiently endure any Hypothesis, to make good the Trinity, except it be such a sawcy one, as sets it self up in competition with his, and would impudently take place of it. Now better the Article be lost, than that the Man, who slightes the Dean's Undertaking, should save it, or that the Church should be beholden for preserving her Faith entire, to the Wit and Learning of a pitiful Dissenter.

The Postscript affirms, that *the Enquirer does not in every particular say, what the Dean says, yet he says what will justify the Dean against the heavy Charge of Trithism*. The Postscript makes good this Affirmation thus, — *What the Dean says of Three distinct, eternal, infinite Minds; that Mr. H. says as plainly, and in more obnoxious Terms*. What a lamentable Argument is this? Will Mr. *H*'s broad Tritheistical Discourse evince that Mr. Dean has not made just such another? Will *Clootius*'s Lewdness absolve all the wild Gallants in *Rome*? He that sets up three Gods, and thereby shews what little Reverence he has for the one true God, though he may chance to find others, who preach and print as perversly as himself, is nevertheless a Tritheist; their running into the same wicked Error, will not at all excuse him. Again, it is to be noted, that the Dean in charging Mr. *H*. to have used more obnoxious Terms than himself, [he means more liable to be understood, as implying three Gods] does grant that he himself has used obnoxious Terms; Terms implying three Gods; then is he more to be blamed than Mr. *H*—w: be-

cause, though he be an unlucky Tritheist, yet does not seem to know it; but the Dean professes to know the bad Consequence of his obnoxious Terms, and yet is not ashamed to use them.

The Dean has briefly and fairly recounted what Manner of Representation Mr. *H*. has given of a Trinity in the Godhead, which may be yet more briefly set down thus; — “ God can unite two Spirits in “ as close an Union as Soul and Body, which “ after their Union shall remain distinct “ and distinct by their own individual Essences, “ and distinct by their singular Essences; and “ if he can thus unite Two, then Three; “ and if Three, then it must be granted “ possible, that Three eternal uncreated “ Spirits may be united in the Godhead, “ retaining their several Distinctions, notwithstanding the close and numerical Union. Further, — the Union of the Divine “ and Humane Nature in one Person, is not “ more conceivable, nor possible, than the “ Union of three distinct Essences, or individual Natures in the Godhead.

Now is Mr. Dean, in the Malice of his Heart, for sending Mr. *H*—w to Dr. *S*—th, to know of him if this be not Trithism: But for my part, if I were to die for't, I could find no Difference between them. Three distinct Minds or Spirits, and Three distinct Essences or Natures, with all the Perfections of the Godhead in all and every of them, can be no less than three Gods. Yet the Dean is pleased to say [looking upon Mr. *H*. as a convicted Tritheist, without a word to offer for his Hypothesis] that the Animadverter charges him (the Dean) with Trithism only by consequence. Eless it how would he be charged? He has had the Luck hitherto, and I hope will have the Wit hereafter, to forbear the asserting in plain Terms, that there be Three Gods; but his Hypothesis plainly implies it, and Mr. *H*—w's does no more; and Dr. *S*—th has proved his Charge against the Former. No, no, says the Dean, for three distinct Minds are not three distinct Substances or Essences.

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No! What are they then? Why, they are three distinct thinking Beings: *Defence of Dr. Sher. Nation, p. 86.* This Dean may advance what Notions he pleases, and never stand in fear of any Arguments which can be brought against him; for as Mr. *Bays* in the Rehearsal, out-wrote all his envious Brethren, by the help of a *Drama Common-place-Book*, so he with the help of an Ecclesiastical-Polity Common-place-Book, when he has advanced foolish and inconsistent Notions, shall easily reconcile himself to himself, and make good that Conclusion which best suits his present Purpose; or when the worst comes to the worst, puzzle the Cause, save his Honour, [which is all he cares for] and hide his Nonsense.

The Rules of that wonderful Book, are said to be these.

The first *Regula fiducia*, or the Rule of Assurance. This Rule directs him, first, in *causa simplici*, as thus: If the Importunity of Hereticks forces us to find Names for that, to which nothing in Nature answers, if they will not give us leave, we must take leave to use such Names as we can find: *Def. p. 14. 2dly*; It impowers him to cut off the dangerous Horns of a merciless *Dilemma*, with a Fore-stroak the one, with a Back-stroak the other; as thus: If a saucy Adversary charges him with Self-contradiction, he tells him, that it is impossible to know what a Contradiction is: and when himself charges a Transubstantiating Blockhead with Self-contradiction, then it is possible to know what a Contradiction is. *Vindice of Trin. p. 4.*

His Second Rule is *Regula consensu*, or the Rule of Company; it may be call'd *Regula revolutio*: this Rule may have two Intentions; both which he follows with this one Resolution, not to be damn'd alone, give him Company and it's another thing: Hence you have him frequently returning Railing for Railing, and he can hardly forbear in open words the base Language of grinning-

Dog to Dr. S.—*ib*; *Def. p. 39.* He does give it him by Rhetorical Insinuation; and when he has made his Adversaries Opinion appear as absurd as his own, he thinks himself safe; for why may not he have the luck to be thought in the Right, when they that oppose him cannot mend the Matter? Thus when Dr. S.—*ib* tells him, that Three distinct Minds are Three distinct Substances; he replies, that according to the received Definition of a Person, [which is, *Substantia individua natura rationalis*] Three Persons are Three distinct Substances; and let the Doctor bring off Three Persons, he will do as much for Three Minds: *Def. p. 89.* And thus he disputes, and is too hard for all that own the Achanasian-Creed, and explain the Mystery otherwise than he does: If (saith he) every distinct Person in the Trinity, be not a distinct infinite eternal Mind, there's an end of the Dean's Notion; but then there will be an end of a Trinity of Divine Persons also, and we shall have nothing left but a Trinity of Modes, Postures, Names. *Def. p. 8.*

His Third Rule is *Regula persona*, or the Rule of Disguise: By this Rule he winds and turns things as he pleases; shows how things are true, and how false; and how neither true nor false. For example; when he had never a good material Image of the Trinity, nothing but a faint Resemblance or two of it; he says that the proper and natural Signification of Words cannot reach the Mystery; a Theological Use of words perhaps may represent it; *Def. p. 13.* and to prove the Trinity, they must be forc'd to use improper Words in unnatural Significations: for, says he, the Names of Distinction in ordinary use, not only distinguish, but divide and separate their Subjects; but in the Trinity, the word *Person* is us'd in the Sense of Distinction, and not of Separation, i. e. in a senseless Sense, in a Sense whereof we have no Idea, in an impossible Sense, or to speak fully, in the Dean's Sense. A *Trinity*, in the proper Signification of Words, is a Fugment; in the improper, an Article of Faith. But

now for *me* comp. *Matters* to disguise all, perhaps 'tis nor Figure, nor Article of Faith ; for in his *Visitation of the Trinity*, p. 4. he confesses, that he neither understands, nor comprehends the thing whereof he speaks : and if he don't, no Body else does, that's certain ; so then 'tis to no purpose to dispute the Controversy, but 'tis direct madness to fault his Explication.

His Fourth Rule, is *Regula Atinios*, or the Rule of Extenuation, and lessening the Matter, when it looks gross, and like an overgrown Monster. Thus he pleads, that his new Divinity may not disgust his Reader : Custom indeed has not made the Form of his Expressions Orthodox, but they have no Heretical Sense in them. Again, Tho the living Image is the same Man with the Prototype ; yet 'tis no mortal Sin against Logic, and common Sense, to say that a Man, and his living Image, are two distinct Men. *Def.* p. 31.

His Fifth Rule, is *Regula Suppositorum*, or the Rule of putting Cases ; not such as the Gentlemen of the *Temple* put, which have happen'd, and may do so again, but of putting Cases which never did, never can happen. This is a singular Rule, and of infinite use : for let him coin a Notion, like which there is nothing in all Nature, such as the natural Unity of mutual Consciousness ; why, 'tis but supposing an impossible Case, and the airy Notion is as easily convey'd to your Mind as you could wish. *Def.* p. 33. O the wonderful Virtue of an impossible Case suppos'd, to convey the true meaning of an incomprehensible Mystery to the Mind of a Man ! Again thus, He supposes a Man, with a living substantial perfect Image of himself ; which living substantial perfect Image of himself, is but the very same Man as himself ; tho sometimes perhaps they may be two Men, i. e. when they don't agree. *Def.* p. 31. Once more, He supposes a Beast to be a Person ; nor that he thought

the Expression proper, but only by way of Allusion, and Accommodation, the better to represent the Union of Two Natures into One Person, which are Two Persons, or something as like Two Persons, as their Natures will permit them, when they subsist apart. *Def.* p. 46. What if I should put an idle Case, Had I this Man's Deanery, could not I talk as wisely ?

His Sixth Rule, is *Regula Tenthrarum*, or the Rule of darkning the Matter. Thus having often granted, that the whole Divine Essence was in the Father, and in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost ; to prevent the Consequence, that then there are Three Divine Essences, he carefully distinguishes and tells his Reader, that the whole Divine Essence subsists thrice, not by multiplying, but by repeating it self. There's a Vail thrown over the Matter now ; and where's the Man that has that Eagle's, or Epidaurian Serpent's Eye as to pierce through it ? But after all, I could wish, that he had forbore this Distinction, for hence may arise a knotty Question, which may give Posterity much trouble, viz. Whether a Sinner that repeats his Injustice, Intemperance, and Lying, may be said to multiply his Iniquities ? or whether all is but one Fault, subsisting often by frequent repetition ?

He has many darkning Distinctions, some in common with his Trinitarian Friends and Enemies, such as Creation, Generation, Procession ; other peculiar to himself, such as 'tis one thing to consider a Person distinctly and by himself, another to consider him separately and apart : but for a thick cloudy one, you shall not meet with one more serviceable than this, The Divine Nature is one individual Nature ; but not one single Nature. *Def.* p. 18.

I come now to his last Rule, which indeed and in truth, is no Rule ; but he uses it so frequently, one might imagine it was his main Rule : consider it separately, and apart from

from the rest, and it is plain that it is no Rule of his; but consider it distinctly, and you'll find that it is a Rule to him, ay, and that more proper words could not have been thought on to represent it, for it is call'd *Regula oblitiscens*, or the Rule of Forgetfulness. By this Rule, without blushing, he tells Dr. S.—*th*, that three distinct-Minds, are three distinct thinking Beings, not three distinct Substances; *Dis. p. 83. tho p. 19.* he had disputed against the Being of but one single Divine Nature in the Godhead, quoted and consented with *Victorinus Afer*, that 'tis not lawful to say there is but one Substance. Thus also, *p. 26.* he says, that he does professedly teach, that each of the three Persons has entirely all the Perfections of the Divine Nature, Divine Wisdom, Power and Goodness; and therefore each of them is an eternal infinite Mind, distinct from each other: *tho he had said, p. 26.* that neither the Son, nor Holy Ghost, was an absolute, compleat, independent God; and yet one would think, the Person that has all the Perfections of the Godhead, should be a perfect God. 'Twere easy to give more Instances of his practice of the Rule of Forgetfulness; but I will not forestall Dr. S.—*th*, I only take leave to observe, that it is a very shameful Practice, and not to be indur'd in any Man but the Dean; but in him it may be indur'd, because he can shade it by the Rule of Darkness, Rule the Sixth; or alter the Looks of it, by the Rule of Disguise, Rule the Third; or throw the disgrace of it upon his Adversaries, by the Rule of Company, or Recrimination, Rule the Second; or prove it no shameful Practice, by the Rule of putting Cases, Rule the Fifth; or take off from the Odiousness of it, by the Rule of Extenuation, Rule the Fourth: and if none of all these help him in his Distress, he has his first Rule, the Rule of Assurance, which is, *φάρμακον σκότος*; by which he will outface the Matter, *in re malâ, animo si nare bono, juvat, ut nihil suprà.* But after all these helpful-Rules of his Ecclesiastical-Polity Common-place-Book, as a Friend, I would advise him

to consider, whether he be concern'd in that of St. Paul to Timothy; *If any Man teach otherwise, and consent not to wholesome Words, even the Words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and to the Doctrine which is according to Godliness: He is proud, knowing nothing, but dotting about Questions and Strifes of Words, whereof cometh Envy, Strife, Railings, evil Surmisings.* Εἰ τις ἑτεροδιδασκαλεῖ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστέλλῃται ὑμῖν αἰνῶσι λόγοις τοῖς τῷ Κυρίῳ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, καὶ τῇ κατὰ ἐπιστολὴν διδασκαλίᾳ, τῇ πίστεϊ, καὶ ἀγαπῇ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ νοστῶν περὶ ζητήσεως καὶ λογιμαχίας, ἐξ ὧν γίνεται ὀργή, καὶ ἔρις, βλασφημία, καὶ κακοδομία ποικίλη. Upon the word *λογιμαχίας*, Scrive of Words, Erasmus notes, *quod Interpretes Græci dixerit calumnie logismῶν*, which, but for the tried and known Loyalty and Orthodoxy of the Dean, I would render *seditious Reasonings*.

To return from this long Digression, if such it be; for though it is off from the *Postscript*, yet not altogether beside the Matter. The Dean justly and truly observes, that Mr. H-w's Three Spirits, and Essences, and Individual Natures, which make up the Unity of the Godhead, as he has represented it, do not seem to be Infinite: for, that which Three become by being united, not any one of them can be suppos'd to be, consider'd by himself: If each cannot be consider'd by himself, then the Three cannot be distinguish'd; if each can be consider'd by himself, each must be consider'd as not wholly the same with all the Three in Union. But the Dean forgetfully, and unruly says, that he allows but One Divine Essence, and One individual Nature; for, [not to take notice of that pitiful Nonsense, One Divine Nature repeated in Three Persons without Multiplication] *P. 91.* of his *Self-Defence*, he has these exprecis words, *The Dean knows no Divine Substance, or Essence, distinct from the three-Divine Persons; but that the Essence makes the Person.* What he means by the Essence makes the Person, I do not well know; but 'tis most manifest, that if a Divine Essence, and a Divine Person, be the

the same without distinction, that then there are as many Essences as Persons, and Persons as Essences, nor more nor less. In my mind, Three Divine Essences, are too many by two; he had better lose two Persons, than be overflor'd with Divine Essences; for one Divine Essence, and one Divine Person, is enough for any truly honest and religious Man.

When the Dean declares, that to own Three Essences, and Three individual Natures in the Godhead, without making Three Gods, seems to have some Difficulty: methinks he seems to fear, that the same may be said of his Three Minds. But as I have above noted, Three single Essences he can admit of, and they will go for Three individual Essences, with any Man that has a thinking Mind, and no mysterious By-cause to serve.

Mr. H—w having said, in his *Sober Enquiry*, that the Dean's Hypothesis left out the very *Nexus*, that should unite the Three Persons, and that mutual Consciousness between Two or Three Spirits, will not constitute them one Thing. The Dean answers him with studied Respect to his *Rule of Disguise*; *Mutual Consciousness* (says he) is not a *Mutual Inspection*, or *Insight into one another*, but a *feeling each other in themselves*. But for my part, I hate a Disguise; and therefore I will make as bold with him, as he with the Unitarians; and if he will not give me leave, I will take leave to pull it off.

Mutual Consciousness (says he) is not a Mutual Perspection, or Insight into another, but a Feeling each other in themselves. Now I will prove, that it is both a Seeing, and Feeling, nay, and a knowing too each other in themselves. *Def. p. 73.* "Persons essentially one by Mutual Consciousness, do see, and know, and feel each other in themselves, as every single individual Mind feels its own Thoughts and Passions. If the Dean will except against this Author, there's an End of my Argument; but, I think, he has more Veneration for him than so. Now by this which I

have here observ'd, I do see, and feel, and know, that the Dean's study is not to frame an Answer to his Adversary's Objection, agreeable to his first Explanation of his barbarous Terms; but to say what is necessary to be said, for the putting by a pressing unmannerly Objection, whether it agree with his Explanation or not. And then again it is worth noting, he is pleased to call, a *Feeling each other in themselves*, (by which he defines Mutual Consciousness) an internal vital Sensation. Now Sensation will take in *Seeing*, as well as *Feeling*; and then Mutual Consciousness, if he keeps to the letter, will be *Knowing* each other in themselves. In short, *Seeing*, *Feeling*, *Knowing* each other in themselves, are Forms of expressing, which he uses promiscuously; not very Orthodox indeed, but there is no Heretical Sense under them; no Sense at all that I know of: but as he complements Dr. S—th, they are *Gipsy-Cant*. Hold, I cry him Mercy, for Gipsies understand one another's Gibberish. His not very Orthodox Expressions, may perhaps be better call'd Rosy-crucian Cant; for that mysterious Order of Philosophers, are the only Persons that I know of, besides our gross Tricheists, who use Words without any intelligible meaning.

Mutual Consciousness, is really nothing but a shameful Instance of the Dean's Faculty in putting impossible Cases, which it were not difficult to expose; but his way is, to ease his Adversary of that Labour, and do it himself. His Self-Consciousness refutes his Mutual Consciousness, i. e. if he has defin'd them aright; for how should he, that by Self-Consciousness feels himself to be himself, by Mutual-Consciousness, feel himself to be some Body else? It is true, an intelligible Sense of these words may be given: As thus, I am conscious to my self of what I think, say, or do; and what is known to me and my Friend, of that we two are mutually conscious: But the Dean never understands words in their proper and natural signification, is never contented, till he

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he has made them signify, what no Body can understand, nor he declare without talking backward and forward, so shamefully, that were it not for fear of his Vindictive Spirit, every Man would do as Dr. S—th has done, i. e. show him his Picture, I had almost said, his *living and substantial Image*.

But he is sure that Mr. H—w can never form any Notion of the Union of Spiritual Essences, without Mutual Consciousness. It must be his Prejudice then that hinders him, for Spiritual Essences may be united by Consent; but that's not the Union he intends, he intends an Essential Union, and that's an Essential Contradiction, and Substantial Nonsense.

The Dean fairly recounts, that Mr. H—w represents the Unity of the Godhead, by the Union of Soul and Body, which make one Man; and by the Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, which are said to make one Christ. Now he criticises, and affirms these to be Personal Unions, [meaning Unions of divers things, which make one Person] but cannot be the Unity of the Godhead, in which there is a Trinity of distinct Persons. I know no inconvenience of allowing according to common Acceptation, that Soul and Body make up one thing, call'd Man; nor know I what Mr. H—w can get by it, for neither of the two singly is Man; or if each of them singly is so, together they must make up a double Man: Which was the Fancie of the silly Indian in *John Dryden's Play*.

*I kill'd a double Man, the one half lay
Upon the Ground, the other ran away.*

But the Dean rejects these Unions, (he says) because they are not the Unions of distinct Persons. But that is not fair, for he himself has confess'd, once and again, that there is nothing in Nature like Three Persons in One Godhead: And I must take leave to tell him, that if there were, Mr. H—w is as like to find it as he: But since there is not, they must e'en both be content with

such faint Resemblances as they can get. As for the Union of two Natures, I have a better Reason for rejecting than the Dean by much, it is building Mystery upon Mystery, and proving one Dream by the help of another.

Mr. H—w's Unity of the Godhead is such, and no other, than the Dean speaks it; such an Union of Three Spiritual Beings, and Individual Natures, as together [which is fairly call'd, by Composition] constitute the Godhead. Against this Notion, he says some things weakly; those the Letter takes notice of, and perhaps I may also spend my Verdict on them there: other things he says well, and with sound Reason, but in them he is most unlucky; for instead of Three Spiritual Beings, Three Individual Natures, read Three Minds; or Persons; and his Arguments conclude equally against his own Hypothesis. In short, what he says well, comes to this; If all Three are but One God, then not any One by himself is that One God: and this he says Mr. H—w has own'd, p. 47. and I think his words come near it, which are these; *When you predicate Godhead of any One of the Persons, you express an inadequate Conception of God.* But to prove himself a sounder Trinitarian, he says that he owns, and that none are Orthodox Christians but they who own so too, that the Father has the whole entire Divinity in himself, that the same subsists in the Son, the same in the Holy Ghost; that each by himself in the most proper adequate Conception, is true and perfect God, tho' all Three are but One and the same God; which does plainly and undeniably prove, that the Dean, and all his Orthodox Christians do believe, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are One and Three, in one and the same respect. For that Godhead, which by them is predicated of every of the Three separately, that very Godhead is predicated of the whole Three conjunctly.

The Dean says, that Mr. H—w's Notion of the Unity of the Godhead, is such, that neither the Scriptures, nor the Ancient Church,

Church know any thing of it. I am of the Mind, that the Scriptures know as much of the Hypothesis of one of them, as of that of the other: and as for the Antient Church, who can tell what he means by it? the Fathers beyond the acknowledg'd Rules of good Life, neither agree with one another, nor any one with himself; but I guess his Antient Church to be made up of those particular Doctors whom he judges to have talk'd his Way, though I won't swear but they may have drop'd a word or two in favour of Mr. H—w's Divine Composition.

Where any late Socinian Writers have declar'd themselves willing to compound this Dispute of a Trinity of Divine Persons, for the Three Attributes of *Power*, *Wisdom* and *Goodness*, I know not. I beg the Dean's pardon if I wrong him, when I believe he wrongs them: for I observe that they have noted that there are other as essential Attributes of God, as the Three mention'd, *viz.* *Truth*, and *Justice*, and so the Mystery will consist of five Parts; and that is two more than it did, when it had two too many. And then if any of the Trinitarians make but an Attribute of the H. Ghost, yet they all do and must allow Jesus Christ to be a Person, and they all do affirm him to be one, and the same God with the Father, which I am very sure the Socinians will by no means agree to. Indeed when

the Trinitarians explain the Trinity, by calling God as the Creator, *Father*; as the Redeemer, *Son*; as Sanctifier, the *Holy Ghost*; the Socinians say, for Peace sake they can endure this; but then they also say, 'tis a harsh Way of speaking, and in my Judgment, off from the Question: for suppose that some Trinitarians could part with the personal Deity of the Holy Ghost, yet they are all pertinaciously zealous for this impossible Piece of the Mystery, that Jesus Christ is one and the same God with his eternal Father; and then, though they may perhaps sometimes think good to shelter themselves under the Profession of One God, for various Reasons variously denominated, yet they cannot compound the Controversy about Three Persons, for Three Attributes. Jesus Christ is a Person, and I think they all make him one in the Trinity; and they may as well make three Persons to be one God as two, and as well some other number as three.

The Dean egregiously mistakes one thing, *viz.* that the Socinians are afraid of the Hypothesis of Three Divine Persons, each of which is God: but I will assure him 'tis no such thing; though they are asham'd of it, 'tis so infinitely absurd, and manifestly impossible, they need not be afraid of it; for Reason will never recommend it, only Persecution may fright them from examining it, who were bred up to it.

On Mr. H—w's Letter in reply to the Postscript.

*Nec quenkum jam ferre potest Casarve priorem,
Pompeiusve parem. ———*

Could *Cesar* and *Pompey* have agreed to share Empire between them, they might have manag'd *Rome*, and the World as they pleas'd: but *Pompey* proud of his early Fame, and long Prosperity,

would needs be uppermost, while *Cesar's* Success against the Gauls prompt'd him to endure no Superiour: so they divided their Interests; the Event was, *Cesar* was too hard for *Pompey* by his Valour, *Brutus* and *Cassius*

flus by their Treachery too hard for Caesar.

Would Mr. H—w, and Dean Sherlock agree to share the Honour of explaining the mysterious Doctrine of the Trinity between them, it would be a great stroke towards perfwading Church-men and Dissenters to Orthodox Tritheism; but as ill-luck will have it, to the Prejudice of every *Diotrepes*, whether of Church or Tabernacle, the Dean is pertinacious for his Hypothesis, *there must be Three distinct Minds in one Numerical Godhead, or no Trinity*: and Mr. H—w, that could be contented to have his Scheme admitted as possible, cannot endure to have it set by, as Heresy. So they expose one another to the scoffing Railery of Theists, and Atheists, to the Scandal of weak, and to the Contempt of wise and good Men. This appears on the Dean's part from what I have said in my Examination of his Postscript, and will appear from what I have to say on Mr. H—w's Letter. Mr. H—w reduces the Dispute between him and the Dean, to these two Heads: 1. Whether the Enquirer has said more than the Dean, or more than is defensible of the Distinction of the sacred Three in the Godhead. 2. Whether the Dean hath said so much as the Enquirer, or so much as was requisite of their Union. Of the first, I affirm they have both said more than is defensible: there is indeed some Difference in the Sound of their Terms, but their Sense on both Sides is equally Absurd and Tritheistical.

Three Minds and Spirits, Three Essences and individual Natures; if every of them is suppos'd to have all Divine Perfections, every of them is suppos'd to be a True God, and all of them to be Three Gods. One and the same is the Hypothesis of these two angry Writers, only variegated with different Terms of Art. They catch, and cavil at one another, for some little By-sayings or Omissions, but return not one wise word to the plain Arguments wherewith they condemn one another for Tritheists,

They are mutually self-conscious of their

Pagan Error, and that suppresses the Pride of their Hearts: so when they shail would raise their Voices to a triumphal Jo, all they can reach is, *I will indicate Three Minds from being Three Gods, as well as you Three Natures; and I will assert Three Natures to be but One God, as well as you Three Minds*. Before I read Mr. H—w's Letter, I could not have imagin'd that he would have rival'd his insolent Adversary in this weak Absurdity; but I see an indefensible Cause will shame a Man of excellent Parts, and high Provocation put a calm Enquirer beside his Temper: For thus, p. the 7th, Mr. H—w, denying the Charge of having expressly said, and extenuating his having implied, that the sacred Three are Three distinct Substances, is content with this sorry Reply; — *There is somewhat more considerable in the Notion of Substance, according whereto, if the Dean can make a shift to avoid the having of any inconvenient thing prov'd upon him by consequence, I hope the Enquiry may find a Way to escape as will.*

Mr. H—w never rose above hoping well of his Hypothesis: here he seems to despair, and the mysterious Article may go where it will, if his Honour be but as safe as the Dean's: Indeed it is a reasonable Desire to escape but as well as the Dean, and it is ill luck if he does not; yet I believe he is not like to escape much better neither.

The Dean in his Self-defence takes the Confidence to affirm, that he allows but one Divine Essence, one Individual Nature in the Godhead: Mr. H—w is content to intimate, that he believes the Dean has said the contrary in his Vindication; I am sure on't, and shall make bold to point to one notorious Place, it is p. 47. there he teaches, *that the Divine Persons are substantial Beings; and that if each Person be God, each Person has a real Being, a real Nature and Essence of his own*. This is enough a conscience: Three distinct Persons with each his real Nature, must needs make Three real Natures; and if each Person is God, each Nature is God [for 'tis the intelligent Nature which constitutes the Person] and then there be three Natures,

B

which

which three Natures are three Gods.

To the Dean professing to own but one Divine Essence, Mr. H—w slightly objects, that the contrary appears from his Hyper-metaphysical Fancy, upon that Passage; —*The Son is the express Image of his Father*: for the Dean descants that the Image, and the Prototype must be distinct, and two in number; and he illustrates it, by the Similitude of the Man, and his living Image, which must needs make two Men, if there be such a thing as a living Image of a Man; and if there be not, who can help it? 'tis no fault of his: And after all, may not an impossible Supposition (to use Mr. H—w's Phrase), though it does not come to the Matter, yet serve to fret our Minds, and disentangle them from being under a necessity to conceive things to be, after such a manner, as will be found to differ nothing from Socinian Heresy? But enough of the Dean's nauseous Nonsensical Metaphysics.

Mr. H—w spares the Dean upon his Distinction between one individual Nature, and one single Nature, only throws him one Pun to confound him; if the Divine Nature be not a single Nature, it must be a double, a triple, &c. and then concludes fairly, that the Dean has asserted Three Divine Natures, unless all ordinary forms of Speech must be abandon'd and forsaken: and I will be bound to dispute this Cause with either of them; ay, and let them change the ordinary forms of Speech, (of which the one is as guilty as the other) provided they will define their new Forms, and in their Discourse keep to their own Definitions.

As Mr. H—w tells the Dean, if the Divine Nature is not a single, then 'tis a double, &c. so I tell him, if the Divine Nature is not simple, it is compound, and so the Dean and he may shake Hands. But Mr. H—w desires it may be noted, that there is this great Difference between him and the Dean: The Dean speaks positively, dogmatically and proudly; whereas he (Mr. H.) does but suppose what he says as possible, not certain [the two last words had been better omitted]; and by this way, for him to endeavour to prove his

Hypothesis possible, is to suppose it uncertain. Well, 'tis granted, there is such a sort of Difference between him and the Dean; Mr. H—w has a Passion for the Article, Mr. Dean for his Exposition of it: Mr. H—w does what he can to make out the Matter, he would give any thing it were made out; ay, though it were by his Adversary, he hopes it will be made out, though he is afraid not by himself: but the Dean positively affirms, that the Doctrine is plainly true after his particular Manner; and he ridicules all his Brethren, who, being equally concern'd for it, would take up with any lower sort of Trinity than a Trinity of Three distinct Minds.

P. 13. Mr. H—w comes to examine, whether the Dean has said as much for the saving the Unity of the Godhead, as himself, the Enquirer: and he rightly notes, all that the Dean has said is Mutual-consciousness; but what he supposes against its Sufficiency to save the Unity of the Godhead, is as weak as the Dean could wish.

Three intelligent Persons (as Mr. H. argues) must be pre-united before they can have vital Perception of one another's Sentiments: But the Dean supposes the Three Persons in the Trinity eternally united, and eternally Self-conscious; that indeed is as wild a Supposal, as a Visionair can make: but the Dean is us'd to suppose impossible things, and Mr. H. not us'd to argue well against them.

Mutual-consciousness will never come up to do service, and credit the Trinitarians common Dream of Essential Union: for should we suppose that Three distinct, intelligent Spirits are conscious to one another's Thoughts, yet they will still remain Three distinct intelligent Spirits, and not one intelligent Spirit: their Knowledge of one another, and perfect Harmony, will come to no more than a Socinian Unity, an Unity of Agreement, a knowing and willing the same things: and so far as I see, the Doctor's Hypothesis is not pure from Heresy, for all his Three Gods.

P. 16. Mr. H— comes to consider over again his own way of maintaining the Unity of the Godhead, and to defend it against the Dean: but first he premises, what I must reflect upon; he says, the Dean's Temper of Mind, in what he writes p. 105, &c. is such, that no Man, whose Mind is not in the same Disorder, will apprehend any thing in it, but such Heat as dwells in Darkness, i. e. devilish Heat. Mr. H—w's Calmness is not so senselessly dull, as to oblige him to die in the Dean's Debt: This was a rude Stroke; but in the next Line he stabs him with a clean and artificial Sarcastm. The Dean had gracefully began his Letter thus; True, Divine Wisdom rests not on an ill-natur'd and perverse Spirit; I understand it, (says H—w) while the ill Fit lasts: So *Joab* hugg'd *Abner*, when he smote him under the fifth Rib: This was enough a Conscience, Mr. H— needed not have wonder'd that the Dean could write that excellent Saying without Self-reflection. So *Ovid* spoil'd *Ominia pontus erat*, with *derant quoque littora Pantos*.

P. 17. Mr. H—w speaks thus: "The thing to be reveng'd is, that the Enquirer did freely speak his Thoughts, where-in he judg'd the Dean's Hypothesis defective; his not taking notice of what he reckon'd naturally Antecedent, and fundamental to Mutual Consciousness; a most intimate, natural, necessary, eternal Union of the Sacred Three. Now is it true, that it is not safe to make too bold with the Dean or his Hypothesis; *non illum impune*. But if a Man shall find fault with him, who takes as little Care as the Dean, to write nothing amiss, he must expect to be ill us'd; and to say the truth, he deserves it.

But what is that which the Dean should have taken notice of, and did not? Why, the intimate, natural, necessary, eternal Union of the Sacred Three. Now I am of the mind, that the Dean looks upon his Mutual Consciousness, as the intimate, natural, necessary, eternal Union; according to him the

Sacred Three ever were, and could not but be thus united; and therefore they might again shake Hands, if there were nothing but the Philosophy of the Mystery between them: But since they will not be Friends, I that am a stander by will see fair Play.

It seems the Dean had objected, that the Enquirer represents the Unity of the Godhead, by the Union of Soul and Body, and by the Union of the Divine and Human Nature, &c. Mr. H—w confesses he partly does so, but more fully by the supposed Union of Three created Spirits. Now if ever Men, that pretended to Reason, discours'd more senselessly than both the one and the other of these Disputants, they shall burn me for an Heretic. They both confess, that there is no exact Representation, no perfect Example of any such Union in Nature; and yet they will be representing it, over and over again; sometimes by a Tree and its Branches, sometimes by the Sun and its Light, sometimes by a Mind and its Faculties, sometimes by Body and Soul: and that nothing may be wanting in them towards the representation of it, they represent it at length by that which is not; an Essential Union of a Divine and Human Nature, and by a supposed Union of Three distinct created Spirits.

The Dean, as I have above noted, has told us that the proper and natural Signification of Words, will not reach the Mystery: Then if he were not very much at leisure, he would not make words about it; for his Readers must judg of what he writes, by the proper and natural signification of his words, or be content to be ignorant of his meaning; for he has not, and I guess will not, publish an English Glossary, to settle his improper, unnatural signification of Words; which he calls also *Theological Signification*, as being correct to let words go for what they us'd to do, except in Church-Matters and Mysteries.

And Mr. H—w has once and again caution'd us to forbear determining what is, or is not in God, beyond what God hath

plainly told us in his Word, or made our own Faculties plainly tell us: Yet does this Man labour to persuade us, that Three Persons, Three Natures may be in God, tho nor God, nor our Faculties have plainly told us so, by suppositions of things, which he himself thinks only possible, dares not say are Actual and Real; and if they were not only Possible, but Actual and Real, are yet confessedly below the Matter, not able to represent it, much less to prove it. But after all, his grand Supposition is as impossible as any of the Dean's, who allows himself to suppose what neither is, nor can be, when Reason fails him to credit his Fancies; for a Spirit, and a Spirit, and a Spirit, every one distinct, cannot possibly become but one Spirit, if he means by *Spirit* the same thing all along; but if he takes the *Subject*, in this Enunciation, in the proper and natural signification of the Word, and the *Predicate* in the improper, unnatural, Theological Signification, then I confess Three may be as few, One may be as many as he pleases. I have heard, in Table-talk, (I cannot say have read) that the late famous Dr. *Moss*, makes it part of the Definition of Religion, that it be competently obscure; let Mr. *H—w* and the Dean alone for making good this part of the Definition; if they have not (by their Spirits and Minds, Self and Mutual Conscious, by their Three, distinct, without separation; their One, individual, without singularity; by their Essences and Natures, coexistent in one Essence or Nature, while each of the Coexistents is that self-same One, which all of the Coexistents are together, by their State of Real and Vital Union, with continuing Distinction;) made it obscure enough, then I know not, what those words *plain and obscure* mean. I am persuaded that neither of these Writers can flatter himself so far, as to imagine that his printed Hypothesis, has gain'd one Proselyte, or confirm'd one wavering Trinitarian; I can assure them, they have both scandaliz'd and lost several thorow Trinitarians; and I have Reason to think,

that the Unitarian late Tracts, would not have been half so much enquir'd after, if the Trinitarian Writers, by their absurd and contradictory Explications, had not shock'd and unsettled the Minds of many honest Christians, who were bred up to the Article, and out of Reverence to Authority, took it upon trust, without any manner of examination.

P. 19. The Dean professes, that, as far as he can understand, no other Union will satisfy the Enquirer, but such an Union of Three Spiritual Beings, and Individual Natures, as by their Composition constitute the Godhead, as the Composition of Soul and Body does the Man. Mr. *H*. resents this as a wilful Injury, and says, the Dean has a cross Understanding, (which may be true, but not for what Mr. *H—w* complains of) for he assures his Reader, that he has peremptorily denied all Composition in the Godhead; and it is true, he has, *in terminis*, deny'd Composition in the Godhead: But then again it is as true, he has in plain Synonymous words affirm'd the very thing. Both Mr. *H—* and the Dean have asserted that to be in the Godhead, which Composition doth properly and naturally signify: but according to what it does improperly, unnaturally, and theologically signify, they have both denied Composition in the Godhead; so that neither the one nor the other of them is an Heretic, but in a proper and natural true way of speaking.

But now behold an odd Scene: While the Dean objects those very Opinions as Errors to Mr. *H—*, which the Dean has after his own way himself profess'd: Mr. *H—* summons all his Art, to deny the Charge which he is not willing to deny, and to defend the Doctrine which he is not willing to own: Of which I will give Instance, when I have first set the Matter even between them, concerning *Simplicity* and *Composition*. Mr. *H—* has disputed earnestly against the Universal, Absolute, Omnimodous Simplicity of the Divine Nature. Against it also has the Dean strenuously reason'd, and it's manifest

manifest that Three Self-consciously distinct, Mutual-consciously united Minds, are as far from Omnimodous Simplicity, have as much of Composition, as Three distinct Natures eternally, vitally united. The plain Truth, which with abundance of Theological Stuff, these Learned Banterers disguise, is this God's Simplicity, is his Singularity, his Unity of Essence, or Nature. If there be more Essences than One in the Godhead, then the Godhead is not Simple but Compound: But if God is but One Essence, or Nature, then he is *summè Simplex*; which I would English, truly Simple, or Single, or One: but that one Thing, or Person, should be more Simple, Single, One, than another; that is a by-whim of Mr. H—w's a good Mantling for a ridiculous 'Scutcheon. It does not contradict the Simplicity, Singularity, Unity of any Being, that it has several Excellences, and divers Powers of acting. Mr. H—w's talk of Simplicity, which excludes Modes, is pure Banter and Amusement: The Simplicity, and Singularity of his own Person is still the same, notwithstanding the different Figures which he makes, when he is preaching a plain, honest, useful Sermon, at *Pinnars Hall*; and when he is penning and publishing calm Discourses, and vindictive Vindication Letters. The Dean objects, that Mr. H—w will not endure Wisdom, Power, and Goodness, to be the same thing in God. Mr. H—w thinks himself civil, for not giving him the Lie: He makes bold to tell him, it is not fairly said; and here it is that he uses his Art in denying and admitting the Charge; so that 'tis impossible for the Reader to find out his Sense of the Matter. As an Argument, that it was not fairly said by the Dean, he declares, that he only intimated, we are not instructed in Scripture, to conceive Power, Wisdom, Goodness in the Abstract, to be the same thing; and that our Difficulty is great to apprehend them undistinguishable. Now I note, that if it be difficult to apprehend them undistinguishable, then he seems to judge them really un-

distinguishable, tho 'tis difficult to apprehend them so. But the Dean knowing Mr. H—w able to see through a Difficulty, ought not to have charg'd him, with holding them to be divers Things; but then presently after, this forgetful Man, says, 'tis a great Weakness of understanding to define them alike. If they cannot be defin'd alike; then they are really distinguishable; and if he thinks them truly defin'd, when they are defin'd differently, then he cannot possibly apprehend them undistinguishable; and then the Dean has dealt fairly, and the cross understanding is Mr. H—w's.

The Dean urges that Mr. H— by his distinction of Power, Wisdom, and Goodness prepar'd his way to make a natural Trinity in Unity of them: In truth, any Man might have guess'd so as well as the Dean; But the Enquirer tells us, his Discourse was never intended to terminate in such a Trinity, tho it seems plausible, or not absurd. It is a great Fall from *possible* to *not absurd*; and then, that it only seems not absurd, is another great Fall. Why did Mr. H— concern himself with such an Hypothesis, an Hypothesis of so ill a Nature? Why, he did it to disentangle Mens Minds from an apprehended necessity of conceiving the Three Attributes to be One and the same Thing. A Proposition that only *seems*, only not absurd, is no very fine Argument to disentangle Mens Minds from Error: but, to let that pass; who are they that apprehend a Necessity of conceiving the Three Attributes to be One and the same Thing? Not the Unitarians, he knows it, none that ever wrote; for he challenges the Dean to name that Writer, that does not distinguish them, at least *ratiōne ratiōcinatā*, in contradistinction to *ratiōcinante*: let him no more than preface his Discourse with this natural Trinity in Unity, unless he designs to disentangle the Dean's Mind with it; and if so, let him make his best on't. Upon his Success, I will promise him *Egretiam laudem, magnum & memorabile nomen*; He cannot get much more by freeing the Doctrine of the

the Trinity, from the Difficulties in which it is entangled.

P. 26. Mr. H.—w teaches that the Son is from the Father by necessary eternal Promanation, the Holy Spirit from Father and Son; and that the Three most celebrated Attributes, [though I know not why Truth and Justice should not be celebrated as much as they] are necessary Emanations, con-natural to their Original.

Now all this must be taken in the unnatural, improper, theological Meaning of the Words; which what it is, none but the Sons of Art know, and 'tis against their Rule to make it common. But from the proper natural Meaning of the Words, the Wit of Man cannot make out an intelligible agreeable Proposition. If Mr. H. thinks otherwise, let him try, and define what *Promanation* is, what *Emanation*, what *Procession*, &c. if he has any Idea in his Mind of what those Words signify, he may define them: if he has no such Idea, then let him confess himself beholding to the Dean, who teaches a puzzled Trinitarian, to rest his Terms upon a Theological Bottom. But methinks the People are very hardly us'd, when they are requir'd to believe Mysteries, which will endure no Explanation, but in Words that are to be taken in a Sense which neither they can find out, nor will their Teachers tell them. But I recal my self, I think the People are not put to such hard Terms of Communion, but Preachers only; nay, whether they are or no, I am not positively certain, for *Assent* and *Consent*, may be as well interpreted *cum grano salis* in this Matter, as it is generally in some other; and as for the damnatory Clause at the End of one odd Creed, very few are of that strong Stomach, and Unchristian Temper, as not to be sick and sham'd of it.

In the three next Leaves I meet with nothing but barbarous Scuff about Composition between the two Antagonists. On which all I shall note, is, that the Dean puts a word or two out of joint, which is no great matter in such a perplexed Dispute; and Mr. H. falls

upon that, and thence takes occasion to overlook the Intention and Force of his Adversary's Argument.

Mr. H. p. 33. brings in the Dean disputing against the Hypothesis of Three distinct Essences, Natures, Minds, Spirits, necessarily and eternally united in the Divine Being, after this manner; — *God is eternal, and unmade; but whatever has Three such Essences in it, must have a Maker.* Mr. H. is the less concern'd for this Argument, because it does the Dean's Business as well as his; but concern'd for the Cause more than the Dean, and therefore he will rub it off as well as he can; and so he defies the Dean to prove, that there is any Inconsistency between a Thing's having Three distinct Essences naturally and necessarily united in it, and its being eternal and unmade. To this the Dean might answer, [whether consonant to his Hypothesis or no, that troubles not me, nor perhaps, when he comes to answer, will it affect him] Be it granted, that the Terms *naturally* and *necessarily* united are not inconsistent with those other, *eternal* and *unmade*: for *Wisdom*, *Power* and *Goodness*, [I will add] *Justice* and *Truth*, are naturally and necessarily united in God, and also eternal and unmade; but then Three distinct Essences cannot be naturally and necessarily united, and yet eternal and unmade; because the Maker of all things is one Essence, one single Essence, and cannot possibly consist of Three distinct Essences, which is Composition; and that appears, because the Three distinct Essences must either be suppos'd every of them *God*, in an adequate Sense, or only in an inadequate Sense. Three distinct Essences, each of which is *God*, in an adequate Sense, are without Contradiction, Three Gods; and Three distinct Essences, two of which are *God* only in an inadequate Sense, are in a just and true Sense, less than *God*; and what is less than *God*, cannot be essentially united to him, but does depend upon him, and was made by him. If there can be such Things as Three distinct Essences naturally and necessarily united, they must then, as the

the Dean said, have a Maker, and must differ in Union, from what they were in Distinction, as the *Whole* does from a *Part*, or else must be one and three, three and one, in one and the same respect.

P. 34. and 35. Mr. *H.* strives not to understand the Dean, which he ought not to do, because the Dean is so oft not to be understood, let who will strive to understand him; but Mr. *H.* is to be excus'd, because that which he is not willing to understand, he is not able to answer. In short, all that I shall here offer, is, if Mr. *H.* determines that every of the Three Persons in his Trinity, are adequately, completely, fully, perfectly God, then it is plain, that his Trinity is a Trinity not of Persons only, but of Gods also; and if he determines that no one by himself, but all Three together are perfect God, then his Three Persons and Natures, are no better nor worse but the Parts of a Composition as the Dean calls them; and finite Parts [as all things must be called, whereof no one is perfect God] will never make an infinite Composition: which Truth, though very obvious, came not into my Mind till I read a Paper of that great Man's, the Author of the Considerations.

P. 36. Mr. *H.* will not admit that the Three Persons are of a different Kind, or Nature, but that they differ only in Number; that is, as much as to say, that they are all Three eternal, which in *terminis* was too absurd for the Zeal of the Author of the Athanasian Creed, [so I must call it, for *Athan.* has Sins enough of his own to account for.]

Mr. *H.* is now pleas'd to mend an Argument of the Dean's, and then it runs thus; "Though we have a natural Notion of an eternal Being, we have no Notion of Three eternal Essences which necessarily co-exist in an eternal Union. To this he replies; — Does he (the Dean) mean, that we are to disbelieve every thing of God, whereof we have not a natural Notion? No, no, no, it is enough, good Mr. *H.* enough for him to mean, that we are not requir'd by God,

nor ought to be by Man, to believe anything whereof we have not a natural Notion. But Mr. *H.* pleads, that his Notion is most favour'd by Divine Revelation: And is that all? with what Conscience then can he affirm the Article to be Fundamental, and necessary to be believ'd, when the most that he can say for it is, That his Notion thereof is most favour'd by Divine Revelation? Nay, and at the same time, other Expositors are as ready to pretend, that the Scripture favours their Exposition more than Mr. *H.*'s. Let me be allow'd one short Digression; — I dare venture my Life on't, that the Unitarians shall unanimously come into the Acknowledgment of the Doctrine of Three Persons in One God, if but a Majority of Church-men and Dissenters shall agree upon the Signification of the Terms, and publish that one Sense of the Article, which they (the Majority) dare profess to believe: but if a Majority of them are not like to come to such an Agreement, and perhaps not the Tithe of them are, then let them either Christianly indulge the Unitarians in their contrary Persuasion, or Honestly tell the World, that they hold it necessary to Salvation to believe Words, the true and certain Sense of which they judg cannot certainly be determin'd.

But Mr. *H.* intimates, that against his Hypothesis, favour'd by Scripture, there is no evident natural Notion: What says the Dean to this? why he argues to this purpose; If there be Three Spiritual Beings, of distinct Natures in the Godhead, no One of them can be absolutely perfect and infinite; because they are not the same, and no One of them is the whole. Here now is an evident natural Notion against his Hypothesis: to which he replies, 1st. By way of Concession; that it is an Argument of some Strength: But, 2^{dly}, it resolves it self into the Notion of *Infinity*, about which he spake his Sense to Dr. Wallis; and 'tis worth the while to know what that Sense was, viz. That he will not move, nor meddle with any Controversy about the Infinity of the Three suppos'd

sed Substances, or Spirits in the Godhead; i. e. he spoke his Sense of it, by declaring he would say nothing about it; he spoke his Sense, by his Silence. 2dly, To the Dean, he now begins to speak his Sense, by saying something; what that is shall be consider'd.

The first thing he offers is, from his old Topic of entangling his Adversary with as puzzling Difficulties as himself is entangled by him; — He can give any Man as much Trouble about the Infinity of quantitative Extention, as the Dean can give him about the Infinity of Three distinct Beings, which are but one Infinite Being. Well! for once suppose it: but then I ask, why, why should any Man be requir'd to believe that, which (to use his Phrase) gives him so much Trouble; and after all his Trouble, he cannot make to appear indisputably possible?

2. The Infinity of quantitative Extention is an unjustifiable Phrase; for as *Cudworth* will tell him, p. 643, 644. *Body or Matter is indefinite*; you cannot conceive it so great, but you may conceive it greater; but 'tis not positively and actually infinite, as God is, his Power, &c. is so great, that it cannot be conceived greater. 3. Though we have not an adequate and fully commensurate Knowledge of the Nature of Matter, yet we are certain that contradictory Affirmations concerning it, cannot be both true; and so we are also certain, that contradictory Affirmations concerning the Nature of the Godhead, cannot be both true. 4. Mr. H's Hypothesis does suppose contradictory Affirmations; for it supposes Three perfect Beings, each of which is God; and that these Three perfect Beings are but One perfect Being, and but One God; and 'gainst this the Dean argues well.

The second thing he offers is, that he thinks it demonstrable that One Infinite can never be from another by voluntary Production; by necessary Emanation he supposes it may. I note; If one Infinite can be from another, (by what Way soever) then there may be more Infinities than One; and further, necessary Emanation is a Theo-

logical Phrase, by which, nor Mr. H. nor any Trinitarian else, can tell us what is to be understood.

I will not say that necessary Emanation is Gipsy Cant, as the Dean pronounces of some Words of Doctor S—th, nor understanding his own gross Raillery; for Gipsy Cant is intelligible Stuff under uncouth Terms, which is more than the Dean meant to allow to Dr. S—th's words; but I think I may truly call necessary Emanation perfect Banter; for 'tis an Amusing Phrase, that will not endure to be explain'd, and will only serve to satisfy an implicit Believer, who can be contented that something is said for the Article without considering whether it be intelligible, or only empty words, Noise and no more.

Necessary Emanation, though a Christian Theological Phrase, is really very Heathenish Stuff. What Emanation ordinarily signifies, that we know; but relating to the Godhead, it seems it must signify something else; so the Blood that flows from one of *Homer's* wounded Deities is not *ἄλμα*, but *ἰχθυός*: they eat like Mortals, but their Food is not good Flesh and Fish, but *Ambrosia*; they drink too, but not *Burgundy*, but *Nectar*. There is a Difference also 'twixt their Gate and ours; for *Statius* tells us, they fetch greater Steps than we, or as *Heliandorus Æthiop.* l. 3. they fetch no Steps at all, but sweep along: *Æneas* knew his Mother from a common Mortal Gipsy by that Token.

I am willing to allow the Enquirer, the Character of a Calm and Modest Man, notwithstanding that he, now and then, lets his Adversary know, he is no Stoic. He appears very desirous to be thought Modest; Nay, even when he is defending his Hypothesis with the best Arguments his Wit can devise, he has something of the Pyrrhonian Sceptic in him. He will not confidently determine, nor positively say, things are so and so, as he has set them: but Zeal to a Cause will, one time or other, show its governing Power; witness p. 39. where he adventures to affirm, that we are plainly told by

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by the Divine Oracles of a Sacred Three, that are each of them God. Whereas the Holy Ghost is no where called God, the Son but in a few places; and in those few, the Scope of the Writer suggests to us the Reason of that Appellation, viz. the Dignity and Power bestowed on him by the Father. For which reason also *Moses, Solomon*, and others are dignified with the same honourable Appellation.

Plainly told of Three, that are each of them God] *ὡς ἀγαλλίας πνεύμα' ἐστ!* How hard a thing is it, when a Man is engag'd, *And how vainly*, to serve a Cause, to make a Conscience of what he affirms? We are indeed, as he truly notes, plainly told of Three, and some things are spoken of each, which cannot be truly spoken of all; but this only proves, that the Three cannot be essentially the same; so that if any One of them be truly God, the other two must be Creatures. Mr. H— is strangely rash to affirm, that the Scripture plainly tells us of Three distinct Persons, each of which is God; for had that been true, this Controversy had never been.

It is, as Mr. H. judges, easier to count Three, than to determine of Infiniteness: But then how bold is he, to determine of the One as he does, and how unlucky is he in counting the other? for he determines that each of the Three distinct Persons are the Infinite God, [sometimes perhaps he uses abating Expressions]; and he counts God the Father, God the Son, God the Holy Ghost, for One God.

The Dean had argued, that if all Three Persons by Composition are but one God, neither of them, by himself, is true and perfect God. Which invidious Consequence he charges Mr. H— to have own'd. Mr. H— replies, that this is most untruly said, and that for his part, he denies both *Antecedent*, and *Consequent* too. If Mr. H— can indulge himself to deny in one place, what he has affirm'd in another, he shall always have something to say for himself, whatsoever is said against him: but the Dean's Charge was honest, for *Calm Dis-*

P. 47. Mr. H— writes thus: *Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, being suppos'd necessarily united in this united State, they cannot but be God.* Instead now of *Composition*, put in the word *together*, in the Dean's Argument, and then surely Mr. H— will not be so hardy as to deny the *Antecedent*; and still the Consequence holds, witness the good Man's next words: *When you predicate Godhead, or the Name of God, of any One of them, you express an inadequate Conception of God.* And pray, what is that, but a half Conception of God, a Conception short of what God is? Indeed Mr. H— did put in another Epithet, and with that his Phrase sounds thus: A true, but inadequate Conception. But that is a Contradiction in Terms, for a true Conception of a thing, is an adequate full Conception of it, and an inadequate Conception is not a true One.

What follows, p. 41, and 42. is nothing but a senseless Scir concerning a Similitude of the Trinity, which they both have us'd, and both confess'd nothing to the purpose. Mr. H— says, He brought the Union of Soul and Body, not to illustrate *Personal Union*, but *Essential*; and yet his Business was to prove it possible, that Three Persons might become one God. So then by his Confession, when he was to prove his Point, he talk'd off from the Matter, as many a fluent Orator has done, that he might not lose, but puzzle the Cause, and so save it.

P. 42. Mr. H— plays upon the Dean with scoffing Sarcasms: But to his Argument returns nothing but plain dull Falshood, or rather Theological Banter.

1st. He says, that the Dean (to make our something against him) foists in a Supposition, which never came into any Man's Head, but a Socinian's, and his own. This is by a Rhetorical *Hendiadys* to call him a Socinian, as if the Dean had wrote his Vindication of the Trinity to no purpose: But herein Mr. H— does him manifest wrong, for on my Conscience, he is no Socinian now, whatever he may have been formerly. But Mr. H— has a Blister for the Wound which that Imputation

putation gives: He said what he said [if we will believe him] contradistinguishing the Dean to the Socinians, that so it might appear more strange that the Dean should foist in a Socinian Supposition. Thus the Dean is excus'd from being a Socinian, and to mend the Matter, set out for a Man of no Conscience; who being, in truth, an Anti-Socinian, yet argues against Mr. H—, by virtue of a Socinian Supposition, and that foisted in too, Mr. H— will not bate him a jot of being a Foister. I see the *Calm Enquirer* is no Angel, for he brings against the Dean a railing Accusation, which is more than *Michael* did against the Devil, a worse Creature than Dr. *Sherlock* by a great deal.

Come we now to the Supposition it self, said to be foisted, *If God be a Person, he can be but One*. Now this Socinian Supposition, or Argument, or whatever it be, does not look like a very unreasonable One; and if the Dean should be ashamed of it, because it is said to be Socinian, he may for the same Reason be ashamed of the most unexceptionable things which he ever wrote. But where's the Foisting? If Mr. H. did not say that God was a Person, may not the Dean suppose it, and argue from it? Dares Mr. H. deny it? Indeed he dares, but with as empty; metaphysical Pretence, as can be imagin'd. *The Name of God* (says he) *is the Name of the Essence, not the distinguishing Name of a Person*. This is perfect Theological Banter, empty Words, to which he cannot fix an intelligible Meaning: But if Person signify an intelligent Being, as both these Antagonists admit, then the Essence, and Person of God, cannot be distinguish'd, but are of the same Import; then the Name of God is the Name of that Person, or Intelligent Being, which is God. And if God be but one God, then there is but one Person, or Intelligent Being, which is God.

Mr. H. pursues his Reasoning thus: "If Three Intelligent Natures be united in one Deity, each will be Persons, [he should have said a Person] "and each will be God, "and all will be one God. I grant it, for,

Dato uno absurdo sequatur mille. Let me try my skill: If Three Intelligent Natures may be united in One, then Two may be so united, and then the Dean will be Mr. H. and Mr. H. the Dean, each will be a Trinitarian, and both will be one Trinitarian: The truth is, nor Three, nor Two Intelligent Natures can be united into One the same Intelligent Nature. Nor can Mr. H. and the Dean be united into the same Man; they come indeed close up to one another, and are together by the Ears, but they can never be united into One.

Mr. H. thinks it makes for him, tho I know not which way, that he hath, as Divines commonly do, stil'd the Father *Fons Trinitatis*. What is the Theological Sense of that Phrase, I am not able to say; the plain Sense is, that a Trinity of Gods flow from the Father, and Three and One makes Four, unless some other Mystery forbid.

To avoid the Dean's rallying his Hypothesis, Mr. H. refers to what he has plainly said of the Order of Priority, and Posteriority. *Calm Dis.* p. 48.

But not a word has he there said, more than that his Hypothesis preserves the Order of Priority and Posteriority, not of Time, but of Nature.

Priority and Posteriority, with respect to Time or Dignity, is intelligible; but Priority of Nature, is a bantering Theological Term, incapable of Definition.

After this Mr. H. says several things, pinching enough against the Dean, but to save himself not a Syllable.

I am weary of censuring his weak Defence, and mean to take notice of but one Error more, but that is a notorious one. P. 48. he says, *That necessity of Existence, common to the Sacred Three, will prove each of them to be God; and the same belonging to the Three, in the Order of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, i. e. in the Order of Nature before-mention'd, proves them necessarily to be one God*.

That necessity of Existence, proves the necessarily existent Being to be God, is most certain; for that being which does necessarily

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rely exist, has always existed: And that Being which has always existed, had its Being from no other. From that Being, which has its Being from no other, all other Beings must have their Being, with all the Powers and Faculties which relate to it: So that the Self-existent Being must needs be God, the Great Creator. But now, that necessary Existence can belong to Three distinct Beings, let it be in what Order it will, that's utterly impossible: for if Three distinct Beings exist necessarily, then such Three have always existed: If they have always existed, they have done so, with equal or unequal Power.

Of Three that exist with equal Power, no one has Infinite Power. Three, whose Power is Finite, have what they have from another. Beings that have what they have from another, do not necessarily exist.

Of Three that exist with unequal Power, the two that have less than Infinite Power, have, what they have, from another, and therefore do not necessarily exist. But if necessary Existence could belong to Three, would that prove the Three to be but One? Then Contraries shall prove one another, and both Parts of a Contradiction be true at the same time: If necessary Existence can prove Three distinct Beings to be but One, it may as well prove One to be None. But Mr. *H.* lays some stress upon Self-Existence's belonging to Three in the *Order of Nature*.

What is this Order of Nature, that can work such a Miracle? Let's consider. By belonging to the Three, in the Order of Nature, he must mean belonging to them altogether, or belonging to them one after another, or not belonging to them at all: If he means belonging to them altogether, then his Order of Nature, is close Order; and proves the Three are One, because they share and share like, in necessary Existence: if he means belonging to them one after another, then his Order of Nature is loose Order, and proves that the Three are One

because they take their Turns in possessing necessary Existence: if he means not belonging to them at all, then his Order of Nature is no Order, [which I guess is what it will come to] and proves that the Three are One necessary Existent, because no One of them does necessarily exist.

Not to take my leave abruptly of these Trinitarian Antagonists, Mr. *H.* and Dean *Sherlock*, two Learned Men, but who are not content to know concerning God what plain Reason, and clear Revelation tells them; but, prying further into his Nature, pretend that they discover Three Minds, Three Spirits, the One of which is not the other; Three Natures, Three Essences, distinct from one another: I shall offer a Poetical Story. —

They say that *Pentheus* having a Mind to discover the secret Rites of *Bacchus*, got up into a high Tree which overlook'd the shady Vale, where the mad Crew were sacrificing; but they discover'd him, and the angry God strook him with Madness: Unhappy *Pentheus's* Madness was of that Sort, that all things appear'd double to him; he thought he saw two Suns, and two *Thetis's*; so that, as he was making towards the one, of a sudden the other appear'd to him, and oblig'd him to change his course towards that: Thus poor deluded Man was he carried up and down, to and fro, but ne'r could recover his Town of *Thetis*.

A Learned and Noble Mythologist applies this instructive Fable, to the Reproof of those Men who dream of Mysteries, and by their admirable Skill in Philosophy nicely expound them. Vain Philosophy is the tall Tree which they climb to pry into the Divine Nature; sober Men note their Folly and despise them, and God gives them up to the Delusions of their vain Minds, while they distinguish between the Light of Nature and Divine Light, and oppose them one against the other: These are the two Suns, and the two *Thetis's*, which draw them now one way, now another, and make them

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of uncertain Judgments, always wavering. Now this is their Hypothesis, now that ; now they are confident of it, and now they doubt ; now they mend it, and by and by amend it again. *Hinc fit* [says my Author] *ut nesciant quo se vertant, sed de summa rerum incerti, et fluctuantes, tantum subitis mentis impulsibus, in singulis circumagantur.*

F I N I S.

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